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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONALOFFICERS & POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-23685 
- and -
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL 
SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
SHEEHAN GREENE CARRAWAY GOLDERMAN & JACQUES LLP (WILLIAM 
F. SHEEHAN of counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York State Correctional 
Officers and Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its improper practice charge which alleged 
that the State of New York (Department of Correctional Services) (State) violated §209-
a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally changed 
the practice and procedure by which corrections officers were assigned to perform 
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vacation relief functions at Greene Correctional Facility. 
EXCEPTIONS 
NYSCOPBA excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred by finding 
that the subject-matter of NYSCOPBA's charge is a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiations and by noting that the matter might appropriately be dismissed or deferred 
because of lack of jurisdiction. The State supports the ALJ's decision and argues that 
the charge should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we modify the ALJ's decision and, as modified, affirm the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision1 and are repeated here only as 
necessary to address the exceptions. 
Greene Correctional Facility (Greene) is a medium/maximum security facility 
operated by the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS). Of the 430 correction 
officers assigned to Greene, 113 officers make up the "resource pool". Officers 
assigned to the resource pool fall into three categories: vacation relief officers, training 
relief officers and various/various resource officers. Correction officers in the resource 
pool are responsible for filling-in for correction officers who are absent due to vacations, 
sick or military leave, or other short or long-term absences. 
Vacations are taken in two-week blocks of time. Vacation bids are made in 
1
 39 PERB H4571 (2006). 
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October of each year. Once the vacation bids are scheduled, the staffing lieutenant 
posts the vacation vacancies every two weeks during the year. Vacation relief officers 
are given the first opportunity to bid on filling vacation slots. If there are not enough 
vacation relief officers to fill all of the upcoming vacations in a two-week period, the 
various/various resource officers are assigned to any unfilled vacation slots. 
NYSCOPBA and the State are parties to a 1999-2003 collective bargaining 
agreement which provides, in relevant part, at section 25.4: 
Any arrangement which is the subject of a memorandum of 
understanding, letter of understanding or joint meeting 
minutes shall not be altered or modified by either party 
without first meeting and discussing with the other party at 
the appropriate level in a good faith effort to reach a 
successor agreement. Any alterations or modifications to a 
written local labor/management agreement as described in 
this section may occur no sooner than five days after such 
meeting and discussion and subsequent written notification 
of the changes received by the other party. Implementation 
of such alterations or modifications shall not occur without 
adherence to the procedures herein described. 
Pursuant to section 25.4, a labor/management agreement was entered into at 
Greene on October 9, 1987, setting the number of vacation relief bids at 42. That 
agreement was revised by a subsequent labor/management agreement on June 4, 
1996, but the number of vacation relief bids remained at 42. 
In the fall of 2001, the parties met to discuss issues related to vacation relief 
positions. At that time, NYSCOPBA was aware of DOCS' requirement that the resource 
pool at each correctional facility be comprised of 50% various/various resource officers, 
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25% bid shift and 25% bid shift and squad (vacation relief officers). The resource pool at 
Greene did not comply with the 50-25-25 requirement, as the vacation relief officers 
made up more than 25% of the resource pool. In August 2002, local managment made 
a proposal to NYSCOPBA to bring Greene into compliance but the proposal was 
rejected by NYSCOPBA. Thereafter, management at Greene determined to reduce the 
number of vacation relief officer positions by attrition. As a result, in August 2002, five 
vacant vacation relief officer positions were not offered for bid, thereby reducing the 
number of vacation relief officer positions to 37. The instant charge was then filed. 
DISCUSSION 
The ALJ opined in a footnote that the June 1996 labor/management agreement 
might be characterized as "an agreement of any kind", as defined in §205.5 (d) of the 
Act, which would divest PERB of jurisdiction or at least warrant a jurisdictional deferral, 
pursuant to Herkimer County BOCES2 She did not reach the jurisdictional issue 
because of her dismissal of the improper practice charge on the merits. 
In City of Albany,3 we held that: 
we are obliged to [reach the jurisdictional] issue because it 
concerns our power to entertain the remaining unilateral 
change allegation. Pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Act, the 
Legislature has made clear that it is not within our power to 
either entertain alleged contract violations or enforce a 
collective bargaining agreement. 
2
 20 PERB H3050(1987). 
3
 25 PERB H3006, at 3020 (1992). 
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We need to first address the jurisdictional defense raised by the State because it 
brings into question our power to hear the charge.4 Section 205.5(d) of the Act denies 
PERB jurisdiction over alleged violations of an agreement between an employer and an 
employee organization that do not otherwise constitute improper practices. This section 
of the Act is triggered if an agreement is a reasonably arguable source of right to a 
charging party with respect to the actions complained of in its improper practice 
charge.5 
NYSCOPBA argues that there was a long-standing practice in effect before the 
1996 labor-management agreement that required that there be an adequate number of 
vacation relief officers to cover all vacations taken by correction officers in the facility 
and that it is the State's change in that practice that is the basis of the charge, not 
alterations in the labor-management agreement. The State argues that the 1996 labor-
management agreement and its 1987 predecessor are agreements within the meaning 
of §205.5 (d) of the Act and that PERB is thereby divested of jurisdiction to hear this 
charge. The ALJ also opined that the labor-management agreement was an "agreement 
of any kind" which we might not have jurisdiction to enforce. 
The 1996 labor-management agreement and its predecessor, the 1987 labor-
management agreement, set the number of vacation relief officers at 42. It is the State's 
4
 State of New York (DOH), 25 PERB 1J3038 (1992). Cf, State of New York (DOCS-
Elmira CorrFac), 39 PERB 1J3004 (2006). 
5
 State of New York-Unified Court System, 25 PERB 1J3035 (1992); County of Nassau, 
24 PERB H3029(1991). 
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decision not to post five vacant vacation relief officer positions for bid that prompted the 
instant charge to be filed. It is not a change in a past practice, as NYSCOPBA attempts 
to characterize the State's action, but a change in an existing agreement that actually 
forms the basis of the improper practice charge. The parties' practice, whatever it was 
before 1987, was memorialized in an agreement in 1987 that was continued, in relevant 
part, in the 1996 labor-management agreement.6 
A determination of whether the State breached that agreement is not within our 
jurisdiction given the limitations set forth in §205.5(d) of the Act. NYSCOPBA argues 
that the agreement is no longer in effect as the State repudiated the agreement by 
failing to post the five vacant vacation relief officer positions. A meritorious repudiation 
claim arises only in "extraordinary circumstances" in which a party to the contract 
denies the existence of an agreement or acts in total disregard of the contract's terms 
without any colorable claim of right.7 The State has not denied the existence of an 
agreement; indeed, it asserts that there is an agreement and that it has acted according 
to the terms of the agreement 
We, therefore, determine that NYSCOPBA's improper practice charge raises a 
question of enforcement of the labor-management agreement over which PERB has no 
6
 Transcript, pp. 37-38. 
7
 State of New York (SUNY College at Potsdam), 22 PERB 1J3045 (1989); Monticello 
Cent School Dist, 22 PERB 1J3002 (1989); Connetquot Cent School Dist, 21 PERB 
1J3049 (1988); City of Buffalo, 19 PERB 1J3023 (1986); Copiague Union Free School 
Dist, 13 PERB 3081 (1980). 
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jurisdiction. However, the parties have, by their 1999-2003 collective bargaining 
agreement, created a procedure for resolving disputes arising from the alterations or 
modifications of agreements reached by labor-management committees. We find that it 
is appropriate, therefore, under our decisions in Herkimer County BOCES, supra, and 
Town of CarmeP to defer to the parties' collective bargaining agreement the dispute 
that has arisen from the allegation that the State "altered" the number of vacation relief 
officers set forth in the parties' 1987 and 1996 labor management agreements.9 
Were we to reach the merits of the charge, which has been the subject of other 
improper practice charges,10 we would affirm the ALJ's decision. Relying on the Board's 
decision in Town of Blooming Grove (hereafter, Blooming Grove)u, the ALJ found that 
the State was privileged to determine that there would be fewer employees at Greene 
designated as vacation relief officers. In Blooming Grove, we held that it is an 
employer's prerogative to determine the number of employees that it needs, in each job 
category, but that the means that the employer then utilizes to determine which 
employees are assigned to meet staffing needs in each category must be bargained. 
The ALJ, therefore, held that the State's action was not negotiable as it had not altered 
the procedure used for the assignment of vacation relief bids, but had simply decided 
8
 29 PERB H3073(1996). 
9
 See, State of New York (DOCS), 30 PERB 1J4601 (1997). But see, State of New York 
(DOCS-Franklin CorrFac), 38 PERB 1J4519 (2005). 
10
 See, State of New York (DOCS-Elmira CorrFac), supra note 4; 
11
 21 PERB H3032(1988). 
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that there would be fewer vacation relief officers in the resource pool from which those 
vacancies were filled. 
NYSCOPBA argues that vacation relief is not a job category but rather a means 
of assigning employees and that Blooming Grove is inapposite. It characterizes the 
charge as dealing with the method by which employees are selected to perform work, a 
mandatory subject of negotiations.12 We do not agree. 
The fact that only those correction officers in the job category of vacation relief 
officer or various/various resource officer are eligible for assignment to vacation relief 
vacancies demonstrates that vacation relief officer is a job category and that vacation 
relief vacancies are the assignments. The ALJ correctly noted that while the State had 
changed the number of vacation relief officers, the order of assignment and the 
assignment procedures applicable to the remaining vacation relief officers and others in 
the resource pool had remained unchanged. As there has been no change in method or 
means of making vacation relief assignments or in the job categories eligible for such 
assignments, there is no violation of §209-a.1 (d) of the Act. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny NYSCOPBA's exceptions and, as modified, 
affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
For the reasons set forth above, the charge is conditionally dismissed subject to 
12
 See City of White Plains, 5 PERB 1J3008 (1972). 
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a motion to reopen in accordance with our decision herein.13 SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 8, 2006 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
ibhn T. Mitchell, Member 
13A/ew York City Transit Auth (Bordansky), 4 PERB 1J3031 (1971). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JONES BEACH LIFEGUARD CORPS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5339 
STATE OF NEW YORK, 
Employer, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS 
AND POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Incumbent/lntervenor, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 
UNION, DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
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In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
CASE NO. C-5443 
-and-
STATEOFNEWYORK, 
Employer, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS 
AND POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Incumbent/lntervenor. 
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JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (MARILYN S. SYMOND of 
counsel) for Petitioner 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MICHAEL N. 
VOLFORTE and JAMES WALSH of counsel) for Employer 
SHEEHAN GREENE CARRAWAY GOLDERMAN & JACQUES, LLP 
(NANCY J. BURRITT of counsel) for Intervenor New York State 
Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Petitioner Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
ENNIO J. CORSI, ESQ., for Intervenor New York State Law 
Enforcement Officers Union, District Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions of the New York State Correctional 
Officers and Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA) to the decision of 
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granting, in part, the petition for certification 
and decertification of the Jones Beach Lifeguards Corps (Lifeguard Corps) in 
Case No. C-5339, which sought to remove all lifeguard titles from the Security 
Services Unit (SSU) of the State of New York (State) and to be certified as the 
exclusive bargaining agent for those titles.1 NYSCOPBA also excepts to the 
ALJ's decision with regard to Case No. C-5443, the petition for certification and 
decertification of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) which sought to remove certain security officer, 
1
 New York State Law Enforcement Officers Union, District Council 82, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO intervened as a party in Case No. C-5339. 
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safety officer, and other titles2 from the SSU and to add these titles to the 
Operational Services Unit (OSU), which CSEA represents. The ALJ issued one 
decision and determined only that the titles sought to be removed in each petition 
should be fragmented from the SSU and did not determine the unit in which they 
should be placed. 
EXCEPTIONS 
NYSCOPBA excepts to the ALJ's decision regarding the disposition of 
each case, alleging a mis-interpretation of the law, particularly the ALJ's 
conclusion that the difference in impasse resolution procedures available to the 
titles sought to be fragmented and the remainder of the unit members alone is a 
sufficient basis for fragmentation and to the ALJ's failure to distinguish the 
Board's decisions on fragmentation from those involving unit placement/unit 
clarification or initial uniting. CSEA responds that NYSCOPBA's exceptions are 
without merit and that the exceptions are procedurally defective. Neither the 
State nor Council 82 filed a response to the exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ.3 
2
 Those titles are as follows: Campus Public Safety Officerl, Capital Police 
Communications Specialist, Capital Police Communications Specialist Trainee, 
Park Ranger, Parks and Recreation Forest Ranger, Safety and Security Officer 
1, Safety and Security Officer 1 Spanish Language, Safety and Security Officer 
Trainee Spanish Language, Security Hospital Senior Treatment Assistant, 
Security Hospital Senior Treatment Assistant Spanish Language, Security 
Hospital Treatment Assistant, Security Hospital Treatment Assistant Spanish 
Language, Security Officer, Security Officer Spanish Language, Security 
Services Assistant 1, Security Services Assistant 2, Senior Security Officer, Ski 
Patrolman 1, Ski Patrolman 2, Ski Patrolman 3, Special Game Protector, Warrant 
and Transfer Officer. 
3
 39 PERB H4014(2006). 
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FACTS 
On September 23, 2003, the Lifeguard Corps filed a petition for 
certification and decertification in Case No. C-5339, seeking to remove the titles 
of Assistant Chief Lifeguard, Chief Lifeguard, Lifeguard, Lifeguard 2, Supervising 
Lifeguard (LISPRC), Field Lieutenant of LISPRC Lifeguards, Field Captain of 
LISPRC Lifeguards, and Area Captain of LISPRC Lifeguards from the SSU 
represented by NYSCOPBA and to be certified as exclusive bargaining agent for 
a unit consisting of those titles. 
On August 20, 2004, CSEA filed a petition for certification and 
decertification in Case No.C-5443, seeking to remove certain titles (see footnote 
1) from the SSU and add them to the OSU. 
In a letter to the parties dated December 17, 2004, the ALJ confirmed, 
among other issues not here relevant, that with respect to Case No. C-5443: 
"The petitioner's only basis for the requested fragmentation is conflict of interest 
based solely on the petitioned-for titles' ineligibility for interest arbitration." 
With respect to Case No. C-5339, the ALJ advised that "...the following issues 
will now be addressed: the effect of the fact that the titles petitioned for are not 
eligible for interest arbitration while others in the present bargaining unit are ...." 
The ALJ then established that the record for the purpose of deciding these 
issues should consist of the pleadings in each of the cases, the 1999-2003 
collective bargaining agreement covering the SSU, and the ALJ's February 23 
and December 17 2004 letters. 
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In a letter dated March 7, 2004, the ALJ established a revised briefing 
schedule.4 The parties filed briefs with the ALJ and the matter was then decided 
on the record as established by the ALJ. 
DISCUSSION 
As a matter of procedure, CSEA's response to NYSCOPBA's exceptions 
that the "Interim Decision" of the ALJ is not an order from which exceptions may 
be taken must be addressed first as it raises the issue of whether the exceptions 
are properly before the Board. Section 212.4(h) of PERB's Rules of Procedure 
(Rules) states: "All motions and rulings made at the hearing shall be part of the 
record of the proceeding and, unless expressly authorized by the board, shall not 
be appealed directly to the board, but shall be considered by the board whenever 
the case is submitted to it for decision." Section 213.2 of the Rules states: "Within 
15 working days after receipt of a decision, report, order, ruling or other 
appealable findings or conclusions, a party may file with the board an original 
and three copies of a statement in writing setting forth exceptions thereto or to 
any other part of the record or proceedings." 
In support of its position that the exceptions should be denied as not 
expressly authorized by the Board, CSEA cites to State of New York (Division of 
Military and Naval Affairs)5. Although in that case CSEA's motion for permission 
to appeal a similar "interim decision" was granted, the Board did not address the 
necessity of the motion since it was unopposed. 
4
 The proceedings were delayed due to court proceedings regarding internal 
NYSCOPBA matters. 
5
 18 PERB H3084(1985). 
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The purpose of §212.4(h) of the Rules is to prohibit appeals from motions 
and rulings made at the hearing. It does not bar appeals from a decision on an 
ultimate issue of the type that is currently before us. None of the parties 
disagreed with the ALJ determination to first issue a written decision on the 
question of fragmentation. An opportunity to appeal to the Board from the ALJ's 
fragmentation decision might obviate the need for a time-consuming hearing on 
the placement issue. The policies of the Act are best served by our entertaining 
these exceptions, and we find the ALJ's decision to be one from which an appeal 
may be taken under §213.2 of the Rules. We further note that CSEA did not 
make this objection by way of a cross-exception to the ALJ's decision, which 
would have provided NYSCOPBA with an opportunity to respond.6 
On the issue of fragmentation, we have previously stated that the 
availability of distinct impasse resolution procedures is a significant and important 
factor in determining whether a conflict of interest exists among a unit of 
employees when making an initial uniting determination.7 However, we did not 
make the availability of different impasse resolution procedures within a 
bargaining unit a "bright line" test requiring fragmentation,8 and we do not do so 
now. 
6
 Rules, §213.3. 
7
 City of Lockport, 30 PERB 1J3049 (1997). 
8
 Village of Potsdam, 16 PERB 1J3032 (1983). 
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The perception that a "bright line" test was established seems to derive 
from a decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) in City of Auburn9 where the Director stated: 
...[According to the Board's recently issued decision 
in City ofLockport, 30 PERB 1J3049 (October 9, 
1997), a unit cannot include both titles that are not 
entitled to compulsory interest arbitration in the 
resolution of an impasse in collective negotiations 
pursuant to §209.4 of PERB's Rules of Procedure and 
titles that are eligible for interest arbitration. 
However, the Board did not make such a finding. In fact, the Board said, 
The Director included the fire chief and the police 
chief in the at-issue unit. We have long had a practice 
of establishing separate units of police officers and 
fire fighters. " Apart from historical reasons, this 
practice derives from a recognition that policemen 
and firefighters are not only fundamentally different 
from everyone else but also that they are different 
from each other in ways that affect the essence of 
their labor relations." (Citation omitted) In addition, the 
police chief, as a member of an eligible police 
department, and the fire chief, as a member of a fire 
department, are entitled to compulsory interest 
arbitration in the resolution of an impasse in collective 
negotiations, pursuant to §209.4 of our Rules of 
Procedure. The other employees in the unit found 
appropriate by the Director are not eligible for such 
dispute resolution procedures. We have previously 
decided that "the difference in applicable impasse 
resolution procedures is a significant and important 
reason for defining a separate unit for police officers 
[citing to Village of Skaneateles, 16 PERB 1J3070 at 
3113 (1983)] and firefighters. We find, therefore, that 
the police chief and fire chief are not appropriately 
placed in the same unit sought by the petitioner, and 
the petition is dismissed as to them.10 
9
 30 PERB H4036, at 4088 (1997). 
10
 30 PERB H3049, at 3113-14 (1997). 
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Rather than establishing a new "bright line" test, the Board reiterated its prior 
precedent concerning uniting of police and fire titles, noting that differences in the 
types of dispute resolution procedures available to different categories of 
employees are significant and important. However, he Board did not state that 
these differences alone were dispositive in uniting determinations. 
While ALJs have failed to approve the creation of a new unit consisting of 
various titles that do not have the same impasse resolution procedures or place a 
newly created title into a unit with impasse resolution procedures different from 
those available to the new title,11 the standard for fragmentation of an existing 
unit differs from that for an initial uniting determination. Historically, we have 
declined to fragment a long-standing unit, even where we would not have placed 
the positions sought to be removed in the unit in the first instance.12 Instead, we 
have interpreted the Act as requiring as few units as possible so long as each 
unit is compatible with the joint responsibilities of the public employer and public 
employees to serve the public.13 
In an earlier case involving this unit, we reiterated our long-standing 
policies in deciding uniting questions: "to find appropriate the largest unit 
11
 County of Sullivan and Sullivan County Sheriff, 38 PERB 1J4014 (2005), 
County of Rockland, 34 PERB 1J4021 (2001). 
12
 See County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff,22 PERB 1J3055 (1989), County of 
Warren, 21 PERB 1J3037 (1988), Village of Potsdam, 16 PERB 1J3032 (1983). 
13
 Act, §207.1 (c); see State of New York, 5 PERB 1J3022 at 3043 (1972). 
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permitting effective negotiations" and to refuse to fragment existing bargaining 
units "in the absence of compelling evidence of the need to do so".14 
In Village of Skaneateles,^5 we specifically held, "While not alone 
mandating the fragmentation sought by the petitioner, the difference in applicable 
impasse resolution procedures is a significant and important reason for defining a 
separate unit for police officers". The Board's decision there demonstrates a 
more complete understanding of the fragmentation process. The fragmentation 
process is, in effect, a two-step process. The first is essentially the undoing of the 
initial uniting determination and the second is the placement of the titles 
fragmented into a new "most appropriate" unit. Our long-held position that we will 
fragment only for compelling reasons recognizes that an initial determination of 
unit appropriateness was made and that thereafter the members of that unit 
chose an exclusive representative for the purposes of collective negotiations, and 
are actions that should not be casually set aside. Generally, then, if there has 
been a history of "meaningful and effective negotiations",16 we will not grant 
fragmentation, especially over the objection of the employer.17 
To fragment a unit, otherwise bound by a shared community of interest, on 
the basis of a difference in dispute resolution procedures available to some, but 
not other members of the unit, calls for us to presuppose that "meaningful and 
effective" negotiations on behalf of one group of unit members or the other is 
14
 State of New York (Long Island Park, Recreation and Historical Preservation 
Commission), 22 PERB 1J3043 at 3098 (1989). 
15
 16 PERB H3070(1983). 
16
 Town ofSmithtown, 8 PERB 1J3015 (1975). 
17
 County of Sullivan, 7 PERB 1J3069 (1974). 
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impossible. This is not a factual determination that we can either make on the 
record before us, or on our historical experience with units so mixed, as this case 
appears to be the first since Village of Potsdam, over twenty years ago, to come 
to the Board on this issue. 
The instant case involves a unit that we created in 1968 on the basis of 
the community of interest of the various titles that comprise the unit. The 
Legislature only recently granted interest arbitration as the final step in the 
impasse resolution process to peace officers employed by the Department of 
Corrections in 2001. At that time, the unit had a collective bargaining agreement 
that did not expire until March 31, 2003. The petition in Case No.C-5339 was 
filed within seven months of the expiration of the agreement so we cannot reach 
any conclusion about the impact of the interest arbitration legislation on the ability 
to conduct "meaningful and effective" negotiations merely from the passage of 
time from the expiration of the agreement to the filing of the petition which 
effectively barred further negotiations for the unit members sought to be 
fragmented. 
The cases cited in support of the ALJ decision are either initial uniting 
decisions or otherwise distinguishable. Our holding in State of New York,™ rests 
solely on the differences in law enforcement duties of the titles at issue, as all 
titles involved had the same impasse resolution procedures. In that case, once 
we made the fragmentation decision, we were free to consider available impasse 
resolution procedures in determining the most appropriate unit. County of 
34 PERB H3038(2001). 
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Rockland^9 is inapposite in that it involved the unit placement of a newly created 
title and did not involve the fragmentation of an existing unit. Contrary to the 
ALJ's statement that in County of Rockland the Board agreed with the ALJ that 
"...a difference in applicable impasse resolution procedures was a fundamental 
dissimilarity warranting unit fragmentation...",20 the Board in County of Rockland 
only agreed that it was a "significant and important" factor in unit fragmentation. 
Accordingly, as in City of Lockport, we do not find the difference in available 
impasse resolution procedures alone to compel the conclusion reached by the 
ALJ. 
Based on the foregoing, we grant NYSCOPBA's exceptions and reverse 
the decision of the ALJ. CSEA's petition, based solely on the argument that a 
comprised of titles that have disparate impasse resolution processes must be 
fragmented is dismissed, and the Lifeguard Corps petition is remanded to the 
ALJ for further processing not inconsistent with this decision. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 8, 2006 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ JphnT. Mitchell, Member 
19
 35 PERB H3004 (2002) aff'g 34 PERB 1J4021 (2001). 
20
 39 PERB H 4014, at 4050-51 (2006). 
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